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Abstract 
The quickly rising trend of third-party funding in international arbitration is an extremely 
novel and complex challenge for the international arbitration community. Third-party 
funding has a long history in the law of litigation funding but this new trend will require 
the international arbitration community to grapple with this concept in a new setting. As 
domestic countries have taken hugely varying approaches to third-party funding in a 
litigation context, the international arbitration community has a wealth of choice available 
to it in deciding how to approach this trend. There are many outstanding issues in this area 
and there is much speculation as to how these issues will be resolved. New Zealand will be 
affected by the choices that the international arbitration community makes in this regard 
when New Zealand engages in international arbitration. The possibility of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) coming into force is also likely to exacerbate some 
of the effects of the choices made on the state of New Zealand in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,832 words. 
 
Keywords 
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I Introduction 
This paper will focus on the emerging trend of third-party funding in international 
arbitration. This new trend creates complex challenges for the international arbitration 
community as to the best way to approach it. After setting the context for the discussion, 
this paper will discuss five of the main challenges in international arbitration to date, how 
these challenges affect New Zealand and how the proposed TPPA may provide New 
Zealand with an extra challenge when dealing with third-party funding in international 
arbitration. This paper will conclude by summarizing the main issues ahead for New 
Zealand in the realm of third-party funding in international arbitration. 
Part II provides a general overview of third-party funding. This includes an 
introduction to third-party funding and the benefits and drawbacks of third-party funding. 
Part III describes the history of third-party funding and the main developments in third-
party funding in New Zealand to date, including the recent decision of Waterhouse v 
Contractors Bonding Limited1 and a discussion on what New Zealand still needs to resolve 
as to third-party funding. Part II and III focus mainly on the treatment of third-party 
funding at a domestic, as opposed to an international, level as this is where third-party 
funding has been explored the most. 
Once the context in which the debate about third-party funding in international 
arbitration takes place has been set, the discussion at the center of this paper can begin. Part 
IV will focus on the current issues in third-party funding in international arbitration. This 
part will first provide an overview on third-party funding in the particular context of 
international arbitration. Second, this part will discuss the five issues around third-party 
                                                             
1 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited [2013] NZSC 89. 
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funding in this context that the international community is grappling with. The overarching 
issue is whether and how regulation should proceed. The sub issues within this wider issue 
concern:2 
(a) Automatic disclosure of the existence of third party funding 
(b) Disclosure of the details of a third-party funding agreement  
(c) Security for costs awards against third-party funders 
(d) Costs awards against third-party funders 
(e) Recovery of costs by third-party funders. 
Part V will then discuss the effect that any decision as to the above issues will have on 
New Zealand, with a focus how a combination of third-party funding and the potential 
conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement may affect New Zealand’s 
experience in investor-state arbitration. 
II  Overview of Third-Party Funding 
A  Introduction to Third-Party Funding 
Third-party funding agreements in disputes are a fast-growing trend.3 A co-founder 
of one of the world’s largest third-party funders has said that the growth of the third-party 
funding industry over the last couple of years has been “like night and day”.4 Third-party 
litigation funding is an established industry in many countries, and it is becoming more 
common in New Zealand.5 More recently, third-party funding agreements are also gaining 
                                                             
2 Daniel Kaldermis and Paula Gibbs “Third-party funding in international arbitration – lessons from 
litigation?” 15 Dec 2014 Kluwer Arbitration Blog <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com>. 
3 Robert Gapes “Litigation Funding” (24 Oct 2012) Simpson Grierson <www.simpsongrierson.com>.  
4 Rebecca Lowe “Investment Arbitration Claims Could Be ‘Traded Like Derivatives” 12 March 2013 
International Bar Association <http://www.ibanet.org>. 
5 Ibid. 
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popularity in international arbitration disputes.6 Almost all disputes require funding in 
order to be pursued in a court or an arbitral tribunal to pay for legal costs like lawyers’ 
fees.7 Dispute funding is when a third-party funder provides funds so that litigation or 
arbitration can proceed.8 One definition of third-party funding is “a financing method in 
which an entity that is not a party to a particular dispute funds another party’s legal fees or 
pays an order, award, or judgment rendered against that party, or both”.9  
Professor Catherine Rogers argues that the recent and extensive expansion of third-
party funding is a “part and parcel of a more global and systematic deregulation of the legal 
profession”.10 Rogers’ opinion is that this deregulation of legal services has made it more 
straightforward and more viable for legal claims to be purchased and sold like other 
investment assets.11 Furthermore, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 put pressure on 
law firms to invite funding from investment firms that are looking for investments that are 
not directly influenced by unstable and unpredictable financial markets.12 Law firms can 
invite investment by maximizing their assets, including legal claims.13 This practice has led 
to increased interest from investment firms in legal claims, which has boosted the third-
party funding industry.  
                                                             
6 Ibid. 
7 Christopher Hodges, John Peysner and Angus Nurse “Litigation Funding: Status and Issues” (Jan 2012) 
University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies <www.csls.ox.ac.uk> at 10. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Lisa Bench Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) at 3.  
10 Catherine Rogers “Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third-Party Funders” (Pennsylvania State University and 
Dickenson School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 51-2013) at 3. See also Elizabeth Chan “Funding 
International Arbitration” [2014] NZLJ 45. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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Others see a slightly different correlation between the Global Financial Crisis and the 
rise of third-party funding.14 There might be a link between investment arbitration funders 
and the ‘vulture funds’ of the 1990s that purchased the debt of financially stressed states at 
a low rate and then claimed a much larger rate than the creditor anticipated.15 These vulture 
funds may have sparked the boom of third-party funding: 
“There are certainly hedge funds and other entities that are paying close attention to see if there’ll 
be the kinds of opportunities that the sovereign debt crisis in the 90s presented… The vulture 
funds that bought the arbitration awards against states [which gave them control over the debt] 
are in a way what started this. Other investors thought, why wait until there is an award? Why not 
get involved earlier?” 
Whatever the cause of the recent increase in third-party funding, many claimants are 
not taking advantage of its benefits. The attraction of third-party funding for the claimant is 
that it allows a claimant to pursue a claim with no risk when the claimant’s financial 
situation may have otherwise prevented them from doing so.16 The downside for a claimant 
is that a for-profit third-party funder will only offer funding in return for an agreed 
monetary reward, such as a percentage of the amount recovered.17 The risk for the funder is 
that if the funder’s client is unsuccessful in the dispute, the funder will generally receive 
nothing.18 The different types of funders include the client’s attorney or law firm, an 
insurance company, or a corporation, bank or other financial institution.19 Some of these 
types of funders are more common in some jurisdictions than others. In countries like 
                                                             
14 Rebecca Lowe, above n 4. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Helen Arathimos “Case Note of a Recent Supreme Court Decision on Third Party Litigation Funding: 
Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding” (2013) YLC Advocate 24 (Spring Edition).  
17 Hodges, Peysner and Nurse, above n 7, at 10. 
18 Gapes, above n 3.  
19 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 4.  
9 
 
Australia where third-party funding is well established, several institutions now specialize 
in third-party funding.20 The United Kingdom also has a thriving legal expenses insurance 
market.21  
The type of funder will determine what kind of funding relationship the funder and the 
client will have.22  This paper will focus on the traditional type of third-party funding 
relationship in international arbitration: non-recourse financing by an institution where 
repayment is dependent on the client’s success in the dispute.23 The other four main types 
of funding relationships are: funding under an insurance policy; attorney financing (pro 
bono, contingency and conditional fee arrangements); loans; and, assignment of a claim.24 
The level of control and ownership that the funder has over the dispute depends on the type 
of funding relationship.25 For example, with attorney-financing, a client maintains full 
control over the dispute as attorneys are bound by professional and ethical rules that require 
attorneys to act in their client’s best interests.26 Conversely, in an insurer-insured 
relationship, the insurance policy may allow the insurance company to have complete or 
almost complete control over the dispute.27 In non-recourse financing, the level of control 
falls in between these two examples: the institution is not bound by professional or ethical 
rules but it also does not enjoy the high level of control that an insurance policy gives an 
insurer.28  
 
                                                             
20 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 4. 
21 Ibid, at 95 and 236.  
22 Ibid, at 3. 
23 Ibid, at 8. 
24 Ibid, at 5-8. 
25 Ibid, at 8.   
26 Ibid, at 6-7.  
27 Ibid, at 5. 
28 Ibid, at 8.  
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B  Benefits and Drawbacks of Third-Party Funding Agreements 
Third-party funding agreements have both their advantages and disadvantages for 
different players in the dispute resolution process. Describing these advantages and 
disadvantages serves two main and interrelated purposes. First, it provides context for the 
discussion of the main issues that the international arbitration community must face in light 
of the growth of third-party funding in international arbitration. Second, it sets up 
arguments for why the international arbitration community may want to choose one 
direction over another when deciding how to tackle these issues.  
The main argument for allowing third-party funding is that it gives impecunious 
parties increased access to justice in the face of rising litigation costs.29 Litigation is often 
dubbed a “rich man’s sport”: some claimants with meritorious claims simply cannot afford 
to bring an action.30 A party to a dispute in a court or an arbitral tribunal will always 
require a minimum amount of funds to initiate a claim, pay expert witnesses and prove 
damages.31 Third-party funding has the possibility to allow more meritorious claims to be 
heard.  
However, the benefits of third-party funding to access to justice can be overstated. 
Commercial litigation funders will not support claims on their merits; funders will probably 
only support claims where the anticipated return is enough to offset litigation costs and the 
risk of an unsuccessful claim.32 Moreover, defendants cannot take advantage of litigation 
                                                             
29 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9,, at 62. 
30 Reuben Guttman “Litigation is a Rich Man’s Game: Finding Justice and Politics of Personalisation” (25 
Feb 2014) <www.ibtimes.co.uk>. 
31 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 62. 
32 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [41]. 
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funding except for through insurance.33 Evidence suggests that third-party funders are 
otherwise very unlikely to invest in defence claims.34 Defendants who are faced against a 
plaintiff who is receiving backing from a third-party funder may therefore have to 
prematurely settle due to a lack of resources.35 
Another concern in third-party funding is that, in class actions, funders will often 
want a commission from all of the class action members in a class action settlement.36 
Funders will therefore also want a commission from those group members who have not 
signed a funding contract themselves.37 This will mean that the court will enforce funding 
on group members as a condition, as opposed to funding being a contractual agreement that 
parties have voluntarily signed up for.38  
Another benefit is that involvement of a third-party funder with commercial 
expertise may mean that the litigation is carried out more proficiently, with more 
consideration of the possible risks and benefits of the litigation.39 However, a commercial 
law firm that is acting for the client could probably carry out an assessment of the risks and 
benefits of the litigation as efficiently as a third-party funder as a commercial law firm will 
also have commercial expertise.   
There are also concerns that the third party may attempt to control the litigation in a 
way that frustrates the proceedings for his or her benefit, for example by inflating 
                                                             
33 Ibid, at [42]. 
34 Elizabeth Chan “Funding International Arbitration” [2014] NZLJ 45. 
35 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [42]. 
36 Ben Bigby and Angela Bilbow “Storm Clouds Rising” 11 Dec 2014 Commercial Dispute Resolution 
<http://www.cdr-news.com>. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [43]. 
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damages.40 For this reason, lawyers who have clients who are supported by third-party 
funders may compromise their independence due to feeling like they have a responsibility 
to act not only for their client but also for the third-party funder.41  
There are futher concerns that third-party funding of claims may increase 
disputes.42 This may exacerbate the problem of frivolous litigation that already exists in 
some jurisdictions. While this problem is not as prevalent in New Zealand, this concern has 
created a large opposition to third-party funding in the United States, which has been 
named “the world’s most litigious society”.43 The US Chamber of Commerce has argued 
that third-party litigation funding has increased the amount of unworthy claims as funders 
are content to stake funds on “weak” cases that have the potential to reap a big reward.44  
III History of Third-Party Funding and the Main Developments in New 
Zealand  
A  History of Third-Party Funding: Maintenance and Champerty 
Third-party funding has not always been legal in all jurisdictions. For a long time, 
the common law rejected the practice.45 Providing a history of third-party funding adds two 
contextual points to the discussion of the issues that the international arbitration community 
faces with regard to third-party funding in the present day. The first point is that some of 
the original suspicions that arose when third-party funding was introduced have survived 
until the present day. Domestic countries that are more suspicious of third-party funding 
                                                             
40 “Storm Clouds Rising”, above n 36. 
41 Rebecca Lowe, above n 4. 
42 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 63. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Rebecca Lowe, above n 4. 
45 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 6, at 40. 
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are likely to either enforce tighter controls on third-party funding or to ban the practice. As 
the international arbitration community will probably draw on or at least gain some 
inspiration from domestic laws if it intends to regulate third-party funding, it is possible 
that a hangover of these suspicions may become part of the regulation of third-party 
funding in international arbitration. The second point is that detailing the history of how 
different domestic countries have treated third-party funding gives insight into why the 
international arbitration community now allows third-party funding: over the years it has 
simply become more and more common. 
At common law, third-party funding originally amounted to committing the torts of 
maintenance and champerty.46 Maintenance is “the funding or providing of financial 
assistance to a holder of a claim, which allows the claim to be legally pursued when the 
funder or provider of financial assistance holds no connection or valid interest in the claim 
itself”.47 Champerty was historically considered to be an especially “obnoxious” type of 
maintenance.48  Champerty has the added requirement that the funder or financial 
assistance provider offers the funding in return for a share of the damages if the claim is 
successful.49 In nineteenth century Britain, maintenance and champerty were against the 
law because they were held to morally and ethically contravene public policy and both civil 
and criminal penalties would ensue from committing one of these torts.50 These torts 
                                                             
46 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 40. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Sean McAnally “Litigation Funding” (2012) NZLJ 361. See also Trendex Trading Corporation v Credit 
Suissee [1980] [1980 QB 629; [1981 3 All ER 520; 1981 3 WLR 766 at 654 (CA). 
49 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 40. 
50 Ibid. 
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existed to combat a perceived risk that a litigation funder might undermine court processes, 
for example by suborning witnesses or exploiting valueless claims.51 
Even now, some academics have suggested that people still believe that there is 
something suspicious about permitting a funder to benefit from a client’s dispute.52 These 
suspicions may be greater in jurisdictions like the United States, where the funder and the 
plaintiff’s law firm generally receive a far greater share of the proceeds than the claimants 
themselves.53  Nevertheless, the modern approach to maintenance and champerty is more 
liberal. The main reason for a more liberal approach is that modern courts are perceived to 
be less susceptible to the “mischief” that the doctrines of maintenance and champerty were 
designed to protect against, namely the undermining of court processes.54 
However, while some jurisdictions have abolished these torts, these torts still 
remain a part of the law in other jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, the legislature has 
expressly removed the torts of maintenance and champerty in all areas but one.55 Under 
United Kingdom law, a contract can be unenforceable if it contravenes public policy, and 
maintenance and champerty can be grounds for arguing that a contract violates public 
policy.56 In Australia, four of its eight jurisdictions also do not recognize these torts any 
longer.57 In the jurisdictions where maintenance and champerty are still theoretically 
illegal, litigation funding is presumed not to be invalid.58 Like in the United Kingdom, in 
                                                             
51 McAnally, above n 48. 
52 Catherine Rogers “Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third Party Funders, above n 10, at 2-3.  
53 Helen Arathimos, above n 16. 
54 Belinda Barclay “Litigation Funding: Coming to A Court Near You” (2008) Lawlink 
<www.lawlink.co.nz>. 
55 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 40. Sections 13 and 14 of the Criminal Law Act of 1967 removed 
both the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty. 
56 Ibid, at 41. See Criminal Law Act (UK), s 14(2). 
57 Ibid, at 42. 
58 Ibid. 
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all Australian jurisdictions maintenance and champerty can be relevant to ascertaining 
whether a contract is unenforceable because it contravenes public policy or it is an abuse of 
process, although there is a high standard of proof.59  
In New Zealand, the torts of maintenance and champerty have not been expressly 
removed from the law.60 In Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding, counsel for the 
Waterhouses argued that the torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished.61 
However, the Supreme Court said it would be inappropriate to make a ruling on these torts 
in the case at hand because evidence concerning these torts was not before the court.62 It 
can therefore be deduced that the Supreme Court presumed their ongoing existence.63  
However, there have been judicial statements holding that in one of the most 
important New Zealand cases on maintenance and champerty, the court noted that: 
“There has been a dramatic change in attitude, with some jurisdictions abolishing the tort of 
champerty altogether and Courts generally adopting a much more liberal and relaxed approach, to 
the point where many authorizes appear actively to support litigation funding as a matter of public 
policy”. 
Building on this “relaxed” approach, the court held that the mere existence of maintenance 
or a champertous agreement is not enough in itself to constitute an abuse of process.64 
Therefore there is a common theme in these jurisdictions that, whether maintenance and 
champerty have been abolished or not, these doctrines are no longer causes of actions in 
                                                             
59 Ibid, at 42. 
60 McAnally, above n 48; Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [67].  
61 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [14]. 
62 Ibid, at [26]. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Saunders v Houghton, above n 60, at [67]. 
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themselves; these doctrines can only be used to argue that another cause of action, such as 
contravention of public policy or an abuse of process, is proved. 
B  Third-Party Funding Cases in New Zealand 
Illustrating New Zealand’s current experience with third-party funding at a 
domestic level is useful for two reasons. First, it helps in gauging what background of 
third-party funding that the state of New Zealand is likely to have before entering into an 
international arbitration where third-party funding is involved. Further, as the international 
arbitration community is likely to draw on domestic law in any regulation that it 
promulgates to address the current issues in third-party funding, this section also gives an 
example of some of the many directions that the international arbitration community could 
follow.  
Third-party litigation funding exists in New Zealand, although it is said to be “still 
in the early stages of adolescence”.65 Third-party litigation funding is being discussed in 
this paper because third-party funding in international arbitration is generally considered to 
be a “close cousin” of litigation funding, even though third-party funding in international 
arbitration has some subtle differences from third-party funding in litigation.66 To date, 
New Zealand has not yet been involved in an international arbitration in which one party is 
being funded by a third party funder. There is extremely scarce, if any, research that has 
been done into how much the law of third-party funding in litigation will influence any 
emerging laws on third-party funding in international arbitration.67 However, a description 
of the current New Zealand approach to third-party funding provides a background to the 
                                                             
65 McAnally, above n 48. 
66 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 3. 
67 Ibid, at preface. 
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attitudes of third-party funding in New Zealand and completes the view of the domestic 
landscape from which the state of New Zealand will be coming from when it eventually 
participates in third-party funding in international arbitration. 
New Zealand’s litigation finance industry is not as developed as the industries in 
many other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and Australia.68 Australia is 
sometimes labeled “the most funding-friendly jurisdiction in the world” due to its number 
of highly experienced funders, well-informed courts and rather lenient regulations.69 The 
United Kingdom is the jurisdiction in which the doctrines of champerty and maintenance 
were formed, and it has also collected a vast amount of case law and commentary on third-
party funding since.70  
Conversely, in New Zealand, the law on third-party funding has largely been on a 
case-by-case basis.71 The limited amount of case law means that there are still many 
uncertainties in this area of law. This uncertainty is unlikely to be resolved by the courts in 
the near future as the New Zealand Supreme Court has recently held that “it is not the role 
of the courts to act as general regulators of litigation funding arrangements. If that is 
considered desirable, it is a matter for legislation or regulation”.72 
The first instances of third-party funding in New Zealand occurred in liquidation 
cases in the early 2000s.73 The next major development was the Houghton v Saunders line 
of cases, where both the trial court and the Court of Appeal affirmed that third-party 
                                                             
68 Elizabeth Chan “Funding International Arbitration”, above n 10. 
69 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 71. 
70 Ibid, at 95. 
71 Helen Arathimos, above n 16. 
72 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [28]. 
73 Sean McAnally “Litigation Funding” (2012) NZLJ 361. The liquidation cases are Re Nautilus 
Developments Ltd (in liquidation) [2000] 2 NZLR 505, (2000) 8 NZCLC 262,235 and Re Gellert 
Developments Ltd (in liquidation) (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,714. 
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funding agreements are lawful.74 In the High Court, the defendants applied for a stay of 
proceedings, alleging that the funding agreement was champertous and an abuse of 
process.75 The Court listed factors relevant to whether there is an abuse of process, and 
found that this was not the case here.76 These factors were:  
a) The degree of control that the funder has over the litigation; 
b) Whether the funder stands to gain an excessive or disproportionate profit; 
c) Whether the funder is not merely providing funding but has in fact instigated the proceedings; 
and 
d) Whether the funder is a stranger to the dispute and does not seek to resolve the matter to achieve 
justice but rather to make a profit.77 
On appeal, Court of Appeal ruled that it can order a litigation funder to give 
security for costs under section 15 of the Judicature Act 1908.78 On appeal in the High 
Court, it was held that the plaintiff did not have to reveal the full terms of the funding 
agreement to the defendant, although the plaintiff may have to do so to the court.79  
C  Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Limited  
The most recent case is the Supreme Court decision Waterhouse v Contractors 
Bonding Limited.80 The Waterhouses were suing Contractors Bonding Ltd in regard to an 
unsuccessful insurance venture.81 Waterhouse differed to Houghton v Saunders in the 
important respect that it was not a representative action; the Supreme Court specifically 
                                                             
74 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 9, at 62 and 235; Saunders v Houghton, above n 60. 
75 Sean McAnally, above n 55, at 361. 
76 Saunders v Houghton, above n 60. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Sean McAnally, above n 55, at 235. Houghton v Saunders; Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 
3 NZLR 331. 
79 Nieuwveld and Shannon, above n 6, at 235. 
80 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1. 
81 Ibid, at [1]. 
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held that it was not passing judgment on the Court’s stance to third-party litigation funding 
in a representative action.82 The issue in this appeal was “whether the Waterhouses should 
be ordered to disclose the litigation funding agreement to Contractors Bonding and, if so, 
on what terms”.83 Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had required disclosure of 
the funding agreement. The High Court held that the agreement need only be disclosed to 
the court.84 Conversely, the Court of Appeal held that a redacted version of the agreement 
that showed the principle terms should be disclosed to the other side.85  
In the Supreme Court, counsel for the Waterhouses argued that courts should only 
concern themselves with litigation funding agreements that are an abuse of process.86 
Conversely, counsel for Contractors Bonding submitted that the defendant does not need to 
show that tortious conduct has occurred before courts can have supervisory control over 
litigation funding agreements, and that a party should disclose the presence and terms of a 
litigation funding agreement at the outset of proceedings.87  
The Court concluded that, in this proceeding, some of the terms of the funding 
arrangement had to be disclosed to both the court and to the other party.88 However, 
whether disclosure was required and what terms would be required to be disclosed would 
depend on whether the non-funded party has made an application to which the terms of the 
funding agreement are pertinent.89 Disclosure was required here because the Contractors 
Bonding had filed an application for security for costs, and certain terms of the agreement 
                                                             
82 Waterhouse v Contractors Building Limited, above n 1, at [24]. 
83 Ibid, at [2]. 
84 Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Limited HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-3074, 13 December 2010. 
85 Contractors Bonding v Waterhouse [2012] NZCA 399; [2012] 3 NZLR 826 (CA). 
86 Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Limited, above n 1, at [14]. 
87 Ibid, at [19]. 
88 Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Limited, above n 1, at [73]. 
89 Ibid. 
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were relevant to this application.90 A more in-depth discussion of the disclosure 
requirements that this case set out will be found below in the discussion of whether 
disclosure of the terms of a funding agreement is likely to be required in international 
arbitration. 
D  What is Still to Be Resolved in New Zealand?  
Though Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding has shed more light on the New 
Zealand position as to third-party funding, more clarification is desirable. First, the 
Supreme Court in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding was careful to say that it was not 
commenting on representative actions, although Saunders v Houghton may provide some 
guidance in such a case.91 At first instance, the Houghton v Saunders case, also known as 
the Feltex lawsuit, has been called “a sobering example of the need for careful regulation in 
this area”.92 Harbour Litigation Funding funded the Feltex lawsuit and allowed four 
thousand investors to take action for the recovery of NZD 185 million against the Feltex 
directors.93 The significant amount of money involved in this dispute has prompted further 
comments that “[c]lass action regulation ought to facilitate class actions in appropriate 
cases while also providing for effective controls on exorbitant use of the procedure. In 
order to do so, regulation needs to address the role of litigation funders”.94 Thus some 
members of the legal profession do not think that the guidelines even for class actions are 
sufficient, and Waterhouse did not add anything in this regard. 
                                                             
90 Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Limited, above n 1, at [76]. 
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A second issue that the Supreme Court in Waterhouse left unclarified is the 
appropriate level of control, if any, of funders over the litigation, or the suitable level of 
profit that the funder can make from a successful claim.95 In this regard the Court held that 
it is not its role to determine the reasonableness of any funding agreement.96 Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that the courts will clarify these issues in the near future. As above, the 
Supreme Court considered it the role of the legislature, and not the courts, to regulate 
litigation funding agreements.97  
The New Zealand legislature has turned its mind to the issues surrounding litigation 
funding but no legislation has yet resulted. The Rules Committee has produced a draft 
Class Actions Bill and draft High Court Amendment (Class Actions) Rules, which would 
become the new Part 34 of the current High Court Rules.98 These proposals envisaged that 
litigation funding agreements “must unquestionably be subject to judicial scrutiny and 
possible disapproval”.99 The equivalent Australian legislation has largely influenced these 
proposals.100 There was no influence from the United Kingdom as the United Kingdom 
does not permit class actions, and instead allows Group Litigation Orders, which are 
different to class actions in that the all class members must actively partake in the action.101 
However, the problem is that there has been no significant progress made since the 
draft Bill and the draft Rules were produced in 2008.102 These 2008 drafts are still sitting 
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with the Ministry of Justice.103 Commentators have labeled the failure of the Class Actions 
Bill to make it to Parliament a “mistake”, because legislation gives both certainty and a 
user-friendly outline of the law for plaintiffs who are lay people and also for the litigation 
funders themselves, as “uncertainty is a deterrent to investment”.104 
Moreover, in these proposals the legislature does not address third-party funding in 
proceedings other than class actions, as “other proceedings involve wider 
considerations”.105 These proposals would therefore not have been any help in a case like 
Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding, which did not concern a class action, and are therefore 
only a very limited solution to producing legal certainty in third-party funding in New 
Zealand.   
IV Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration 
A  Overview of Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration 
Third-party funding is quickly infiltrating the international commercial arbitration 
sphere. Professor Catherine Rogers states that this is because funders find international 
arbitration cases attractive because the evidentiary costs may be lower, the proceedings are 
often quick, there is generally more control over arbitration proceedings than there is in 
litigation proceedings, arbitral awards are generally very enforceable and there are a lot of 
high-value claims.106 These high-value claims are especially prevalent in investor-state 
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arbitration cases as a funder may recover a substantial sum of money from a state in these 
claims.107 
Some of the drawbacks of third-party funding in general that were emphasized 
above are exacerbated in the case of third-party funding in the context of international 
commercial arbitration. Professor Rogers voices concerns that the presence of third-party 
funders in the international commercial arbitration sphere will create a rise in the number 
of arbitration cases brought against states in investor-state arbitration.108 The increasing 
number of cases against states is an issue because third-party funders are less likely to want 
to fund states.109 Although there is no technical reason why a state cannot be funded by a 
third-party funder in investor-state arbitration, evidence suggests that funders seldom agree 
to invest in a defence claim.110 Moreover, even if a third-party funder agrees to fund a state 
in investor-state arbitration, this is a very contentious move for a state due to the potential 
conflict between the state’s obligations to its public and the possibility that the third-party 
funder may try to control the proceedings to some extent.111  
B  Regulation of Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration 
Third-party funding in international investment arbitration is currently 
unregulated.112 The growing availability of assistance from third-party funders for high-
value claims in international arbitration has been recognized as a contributor to rising levels 
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of particular types of arbitration, like investment treaty claims.113 The increasing number of 
arbitration proceedings has not been welcomed by all countries around the world: in fact, 
Argentina’s threats to leave the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
have been attributed to the rise in some types of arbitration.114 Due to the increase in 
arbitration proceedings as a result of third-party funding, arbitral institutions have begun to 
debate whether new rules might be needed to regulate certain aspects of third-party funding 
in international arbitration.115  
C   Issues in Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration 
1 Overview 
As stated above, the emergence of third-party funding in the realm of international 
arbitration creates challenges. The main issues that the international arbitration community 
must face are described in more detail below: 
1. Is automatic disclosure of the existence of third party funding required? 
2. In what circumstances, if any, must the details of the third party funding agreement be          
disclosed? 
3. Can, and if so when should, a tribunal order security for costs against third party funders? 
4. Can, and if so when should, a tribunal award costs against third party funders? 
5. Can third party funders recover their costs as part of a costs award?116 
This section will first discuss the debate for regulation of third-party funding in 
international arbitration and outline the views of some commentators who believe that 
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domestic law can be used as a model for regulating third-party funding at an 
international level. Then the above questions above will be canvassed in more detail. 
2 Regulation  
Regulating third-party funding in international arbitration would increase 
certainty in the area. Whether more regulation is introduced into the realm of third-
party funding in international arbitration will affect the climate in which New Zealand 
will have to deal with investors in investor-state arbitration. That third-party funding is 
here to stay in international arbitration was made clear in the recent ICSID tribunal 
decision Giovanni Alemanni v The Argentine Republic.117 In Alemmani, the three 
renowned and high-profile international arbitrators on the panel made the following 
statement on third-party funding: 
“the practice is by now so well established both within many national 
jurisdictions and within international investment arbitration that it offers no 
grounds in itself for objection”.118 
The more realistic question now, then, is not whether third-party funding should be an 
option. Rather, seeing as third-party funding is an option for many claimants today, the 
main question is: should third-party funding in international arbitration be regulated? 
Further, if so, how should it be regulated? 
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3 Drawing on Domestic Law for Assistance 
Some commentators have suggested that the international arbitration 
community may be able to draw on domestic law to assist with regulation.119 
However, though many domestic courts have considered these issues at length, many 
domestic courts have differing opinions.120 This lack of consensus means the 
international arbitration community will have to weigh up its options; drawing on 
domestic law will not be a matter of simply applying domestic principles to 
international law. 
The discrepancy between domestic courts has caused some commentators to 
question whether domestic law can actually be useful at an international level at all.121 
However, the other argument is that the dissimilar domestic case law shows a 
“conceptual struggle” as to how to perceive third-party funders and that domestic law 
is therefore valuable to the international community, which also needs to decide how 
third-party funders will be perceived in a legal context.122  
To draw on domestic law, the international arbitration community must first 
ascertain what that domestic law is. Domestic countries fall on a spectrum that, at one 
end, views third-party funding as a valid method of funding an arbitration 
proceeding.123 This is a “market-oriented approach”, as it considers that the financial 
market can fund legal claims, just like it would any other asset.124 This means that 
                                                             
119 Daniel Kalderimis and Paula Gibbs, above n 2. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
27 
 
claimants in need of extra funding can approach the market and join with a third-party 
funder in order to have their claim heard.125 The main rationale for this “market-
oriented approach” is access to justice, which has been canvassed in more detail 
above.126 
At the other end of this spectrum, some domestic countries view third-party 
funding as invalid.127 This is a “true claimant approach”.128 This approach holds that, 
in disputes, there must be a ‘true claimant’ that needs to either pursue, or not pursue, 
its own claims.129 This approach still sees some logic in the previously described torts 
of maintenance and champerty, which condemn the provision of financial assistance 
for a claim where the financial assistance provider has no interest in the claim.130  
The international arbitration community may be able to extract useful 
information out of these two approaches by recognizing that both approaches lend to 
different procedural decisions.131 For example, the “true claimant” approach tends to 
lead to courts and tribunals closely monitoring any instance of third-party funding and 
strict requirements that third-party funding agreements must comply with certain 
regulations developed in that country.132 On this approach, where a third-party funder 
acts improperly, it is likely that security for costs or a stay of proceedings may be 
ordered.133 New Zealand fits within the “true claimant” approach group.134  
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Conversely, countries that take a more “market-oriented” approach to third-
party funding consider a third-party funder to be more of a “shadow co-claimant”.135 
The result of this perception is that the court or tribunal will not examine the funding 
agreement between the claimant and the third-party funder.136 However, unlike in the 
“true claimant” approach, the court or tribunal may need to make orders against the 
funder directly.137 The result of the third-party funder being recognized as part of the 
proceedings then is that funders must also accept the related responsibilities.138  
Some argue that the “true claimant” model is the best model for the 
international arbitration community to draw on as inspiration for regulating third-party 
funding.139 There are problems with applying the “market-oriented” approach to 
international arbitration, even though it may be appealing to do so due to the fact that 
arbitration itself is a market-based system.140 The system is constrained by its 
contractual base, which demands that any claimant must be a party to the arbitration 
agreement that is made against any respondent.141 Thus the “market-oriented” model’s 
main instrument is the ability to order costs directly against third-party funders.142 But, 
if this is unavailable, the benefits of the “market-oriented” model seem to be 
diminished.143  
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Thus the “true claimant” model may be more beneficial.144 The increased 
regulation in international arbitration that would follow from adopting a model closer 
to the “true claimant” model will probably decrease the likelihood of jurisdictional 
issues in the future.145 Further, to placate the international legal community, 
international arbitration could adopt a less stringent form of the “true claimant” model 
than many domestic countries have adopted.146 While many Commonwealth countries, 
such as New Zealand, have been influenced by the historical torts of maintenance and 
champerty that originated in the United Kingdom, international arbitration is not 
affected by these common law torts.147 This will allow international arbitration 
tribunals to formulate rules and regulations free of any cumbrances.   
In sum, regulation is desirable. Domestic courts can give the international 
arbitration community guidance on how to go about regulating the use of third-party 
funding in international arbitration, and the international arbitration community will 
benefit from adopting certain characteristics of the “true model” that certain domestic 
countries follow. In the meantime, tribunals should use their resources in a way that 
protects parties from unfairness due to the existence of a third-party funder.148 To 
maintain fairness and equality, commentators urge that tribunals keep grappling with 
the current issues in third-party funding in international arbitration that are detailed 
below. 
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4  Issue 1: Disclosure of the Existence of Third-Party Funding 
One controversial issue in international arbitration is whether a party receiving 
third-party funding should have to disclose this fact to the other party in the arbitration 
proceedings.149 This issue has been somewhat resolved by the International Bar 
Association’s 2014 revisions to its 2004 ‘Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration’.150 General Standard 6(b), ‘Relationships’, holds that: 
“[i]f one of the parties is a legal entity, any legal or physical person having a 
controlling influence on the legal entity, or a direct economic interest in, or a duty 
to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration, may be 
considered to bear the identity of such party”.151 
The ‘Explanation to General Standard 6’ clarifies that “third-party funders and 
insurers in relation to the dispute may have a direct economic interest in the award, and as 
such, may be considered to be the equivalent of that party”.152 This means that claimants 
who use third-party funding must now disclose their use of third-party funding to the 
tribunal and to other parties to the arbitration.153  
Before the International Bar Association’s 2014 revisions, there were still some 
instances in which third-party funders were required to disclose their existence, but these 
were few and far between.154 For example, if a third-party funder was funding a claimant 
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that was a listed company on the public stock exchange, and the litigation funding 
agreement constituted a material transaction for that company, then the third-party funder 
had to disclose its existence.155 
General Standard 6(b) has three main ramifications. First, parties will gain more 
knowledge as to the other party’s capability to finance the arbitration.156 Some 
commentators think that this increased knowledge may give the other party an incentive to 
settle as opposed to pursuing the proceedings as it suggests that “an independent third party 
has investigated and formed a favourable view as to the merits of the claim.157 The 
presence of a third-party funder is even more likely to encourage that other party to settle if 
that funder is well-known and respected.158 Second, third-party funders are much more 
likely to be directly engaged in the proceedings.159 This involvement is likely to occur if 
the other party to the arbitration either requests an award for security for costs against a 
third-party funder or the tribunal imposes a costs award that is also enforceable against the 
third-party funder.160 Thirdly, as the International Bar Association Guidelines that are 
mentioned above attempt to address, disclosure of a third-party funder allows actual or 
potential conflicts of interests to be identified and dealt with appropriately.161  
However, arguments against disclosure include that if an arbitrator does not know 
that a third-party funder is involved in the proceeding, then the existence of a third-party 
funder can have no effect on the arbitrator’s final decision so there is no need to address 
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any actual or potential conflicts of interest.162  Another argument is that third-party funders 
have in the past been wary of disclosing their existence as this disclosure may provoke the 
other party to instigate distracting satellite litigation or ancillary applications to the 
tribunal.163 
The current position at an international level under the International Bar 
Association’s Guidelines is similar to the position in New Zealand’s domestic law. The 
Waterhouse case, discussed above, found that in certain applications, such as for security 
for costs, the funded party will probably have to disclose the identity and location of the 
third-party funder and how amenable the funder is to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand 
courts. 164 The New Zealand Supreme Court did not offer any jurisdictional basis for this 
ruling but merely reasoned that disclosing the presence of a funder lets the court and the 
other parties see the “real parties” to the proceedings.165 The concept is not foreign in New 
Zealand law: the requirement of disclosure of third-party funders has been compared to 
legal aid, where there is also a requirement of disclosure that a party is being funded by 
legal aid.166 Australia also has the same position: the Federal Court’s Practice Note CM 17 
states that parties using third-party funding must disclose this fact to the court and to the 
other parties before or during the initial case management conference.167 This then is one 
example of how international law has aligned with some domestic laws. 
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The required disclosure of a funding agreement in international law will allow the state 
of New Zealand to be informed of what it is up against in investor-state arbitration. An 
investor being funded by a third-party funder may signal to New Zealand that the investor 
has a good case as a professional third-party funder has assessed the case and concluded 
that it is a good investment. Knowledge of the involvement of a third-party funder may also 
signal to New Zealand that the case could go on for a long time as the investor is likely to 
have a lot of funds to back it up due to the backing of a third-party funder. This knowledge 
may therefore cause New Zealand to settle more often. As New Zealand is a relatively 
small country, the prospect of entering into arbitration with a party who is backed by an 
established third-party funder may be daunting: it may be difficult for New Zealand to 
match the level of funding that some of the larger international third-party funding 
companies can provide. 
5 Issue 2: Disclosure of the Details of a Third-Party Funding Agreement 
The issue of whether a party should be obliged to disclose not merely the existence of a 
funding arrangement with a third party but also the details of their agreement is also rife 
with controversy in the international arbitration community. There is currently no 
consensus at an international level about whether such details should be disclosed and, if 
so, whether all the details of the funding arrangement can be disclosed or only certain 
aspects of it. The International Bar Association’s revised 2014 Guidelines mentioned above 
do not require the parties to disclose the terms of the funding agreements.168 However, 
more clarity may be helpful in this area. This issue is another one where the international 
                                                             
168 “IBA Guidelines and Rules”, above n 153. 
34 
 
community may be able to look to domestic law for assistance in regulation. Australia and 
New Zealand in particular have looked at this issue. 
Australian courts have declined to order a party receiving third-party funding to 
disclose the full funding agreement to the other party.169 Instead, Australian courts 
have ordered funded parties to disclose redacted copies withholding the funder’s 
identity, several terms, and the amount of funding.170 These courts state that non-
disclosure upholds the administration of justice by preventing the other party from 
accessing information that may provide tactical assistance.171 
In New Zealand, both the cases of Houghton v Saunders and the Waterhouse case 
discussed above considered whether the details of a third-party funding agreement should 
be disclosed.172 The aforementioned 2008 draft Class Actions Bill and new draft Rules also 
discuss the terms of funding agreements.173 The new draft Rules state that an application 
for a class action order must be accompanied by affidavit evidence, including “general 
information as to any arrangements, in place or prospective, for funding the proposed class 
action (including the terms of any agreement or proposed agreement with a litigation 
funder)”.174 The defendants must also receive this application.175 Although these rules do 
not oblige the plaintiff to provide the defendant with a copy of the entire funding 
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agreement, they do require the plaintiff to disclose “general information” about the terms of 
the agreement.176 
In Houghton v Saunders, the High Court found that the plaintiff did not have to 
disclose to the defendant the entire funding agreement and the underlying litigation 
policy.177 In this case, the plaintiff had provided the full funding agreement to the court and 
the defendant had received a brief outline of the agreement.178 However, the Court did not 
hold that the plaintiff will never have to provide the full funding agreement to the 
defendant.179 Further, Houghton v Saunders is unlikely to be overly instructive for future 
cases. First, like the Class Actions Bill and draft Rules, the case only addressed class 
actions.180 Second, one commentator observed that “[a]t best, this case illustrates that the 
parameters of disclosure will likely depend on the facts of that particular case, the reason 
for the disclosure, what information is to be disclosed, and to whom”.181 However, this case 
is helpful in that it warns parties that a funding agreement may have to be shared with the 
court, although possibly not to another party.182 
In Waterhouse, which applies only to individual actions, the Supreme Court held 
that there is no general duty of disclosure of the funding agreement: disclosure of some of 
the terms of the funding agreement will only ever be required where the other party makes 
an application to which the terms of the funding arrangement are applicable.183 The 
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purpose of this disclosure is to allow the other party to make an informed decision about 
whether to proceed with the application.184  
The terms of the funding agreement that Waterhouse may require disclosure of are:185  
i)     the identity and location of litigation funder; and 
ii)     its amenability to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts if that is relevant. 
The earlier Court of Appeal decision included two other factors that may require 
disclosure:186 
i) the funder’s financial standing/viability; and 
ii) the terms on which funding can be withdrawn and the consequences of withdrawal. 
However, the Supreme Court held that the funded party under no circumstances has to 
provide details of these last two factors.187 This is because both pieces of information 
could provide the other party with a “tactical advantage” as the other party could 
attempt to use that knowledge to have the funded party’s funding prematurely 
withdrawn.188 In terms of the litigation funder’s financial situation, the Court noted 
that the concern that the non-funded party may be left “high and dry” did not justify 
disclosure as this was a possibility in all litigation, not just litigation that involves a 
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third-party funder.189 Further, that if the other party wishes to secure their interest in 
the dispute that party can apply for security for costs.190  
The international arbitration community may be able to draw on some aspects 
of these cases. Both the New Zealand and Australian courts are generally against 
providing another party with the entire funding agreement, preferring instead to give 
the other party a sparser version of the agreement. This is probably a wise approach 
considering the reasoning in Waterhouse, which observed that providing more detailed 
information about the funding agreement could give the defendant with a “tactical 
advantage”.191 As it seems likely that the international arbitration community will 
accept either this or similar reasoning and allow some level of information to be 
disclosed, the real issue then is what terms will be disclosed. In New Zealand, both the 
draft Rules and Houghton v Saunders advocate an approach of a general outline of all 
the terms. Conversely, the Australian courts and Waterhouse prefer to only disclose a 
few select terms.  
The inconsistency between these cases shows that the international arbitration 
community cannot simply uplift the domestic law in this area and apply it at an 
international level. Although the domestic cases may be helpful in suggesting to the 
international community that perhaps some terms should be disclosed, the terms that 
the courts have allowed to be withheld and required to be disclosed are not necessarily 
helpful at an international level. For example, the amenability of a funder to the 
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jurisdiction of a certain domestic court is not relevant an international level. The 
international community therefore has a long way to go in regard to this issue as it 
may be less appropriate to build on a foundation of domestic law here. 
How the international arbitration community decides to deal with this issue will 
affect New Zealand’s experience in international arbitration by influencing how much 
knowledge New Zealand will have about what it is up against in any given arbitration. 
If a stricter approach is taken to third-party funding and all the terms of a funding 
agreement have to be disclosed, New Zealand will be in a better position to know what 
to expect from the arbitration. If some key terms are left out, it will be harder for New 
Zealand to gauge what it can expect from the arbitration. For example, a funded party 
may not have to disclose to New Zealand in what circumstances its funding might be 
withdrawn, which leaves New Zealand unaware as to whether it will be able to 
successfully retrieve the payment due from a costs award against the other party. 
Based on domestic law, it seems unlikely that the international arbitration community 
will require disclosure of the full agreement. But exactly what terms are disclosed will 
dictate how knowledgeable and therefore how prepared New Zealand will be before 
entering international arbitrations. 
6 Issue 3: Security for Costs and RSM v St Lucia 
A third issue in third-party funding in international arbitration is whether a tribunal 
can order security for costs and, if so, in what circumstances a tribunal should do so. In 
many instances, tribunals have simply refused to do so.192 However, just as the 
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international community may have started to believe that security for costs would 
never be granted, the case of RSM v St Lucia was decided.193 This controversial 
decision attracted a large amount of commentary and criticism from the international 
community.194 The St Lucia decision was the first decision to order security for costs 
in an investor-state dispute.195 The ICSID based their decision to order security for 
costs on three elements: the claimant’s proven non-payment background, its conceded 
lack of funds and the involvement of a third-party funder.196 The decision has sparked 
discussion about whether states engaging in international arbitration should be able to 
get security for costs in instances where the claimant is being funded by a third-party 
funder, unless the claimant has a satisfactory amount of funds.197 
Because the St Lucia decision was such a controversial one, the dispute will be 
described in detail to illustrate the steps in the decision-making process that led to such 
a criticized and contentious outcome. As the award of security for costs here was made 
due to certain “exceptional circumstances” in the case, considering these 
circumstances allows for a better understanding of how future tribunals may approach 
the issue of awarding security for costs. Further, an analysis of the different reasoning 
of different tribunal members in reaching the decision will highlight some of the 
varying views in the international community on awarding security for costs. 
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The background dispute between the parties in St Lucia began when St Lucia 
granted the claimant an exclusive oil exploration license.198 However, after disputes 
about the boundary of the exploration area and involvement of Saint Lucia’s prime 
minister, the parties arguably varied and extended the exploration agreement.199 The 
dispute at issue in the case arose when the claimant later tried to assert its right under 
the agreement to explore the area.200 The claimant argued that the agreement was still 
in force, or alternatively that the respondent has terminated the agreement by 
breaching it and the claimant therefore deserves to be reimbursed for damages.201 
Conversely, the respondent argued for an award to dismiss the claimant’s claims and a 
declaration that the agreement between the respondent and the claimant had either 
expired or could not be enforced, which would therefore mean that the respondent 
would have no obligations in regard to the plaintiff.202  
The real dispute at issue was whether the respondent could be successful in seeking an 
order to require the claimant to post the amount of US$750,000 as security for costs.203 
A majority of the tribunal found for the respondent and ordered the claimant to post 
security for costs.204 One member of the tribunal dissented.205 As above, this was a 
highly unexpected outcome.  
In seeking an order for costs, the respondent argued that Article 47 of the 
ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rule 39 gave the Tribunal jurisdiction 
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and the ability to order the claimant to post security for costs.206 Article 47 of the 
ICSID Convention reads: 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the 
circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken 
to preserve the respective rights of either party. 
The ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(1) reads very similar to Article 47: 
(1) At any time after the institution of the proceeding, a party may request that 
provisional measures for the preservation of its rights be recommended by the 
Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to be preserved, the measures the 
recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that require such 
measures. 
The respondent accepted that no ICSID tribunal had in the past made an order for 
security for costs.207 Nevertheless, the respondent argued that certain exceptional 
circumstances in the present case warranted a successful application for security 
for costs.208 The tribunal agreed that exceptional circumstances in this case 
supported an award of security for costs.209 
The respondent pointed to several different circumstances as to why it thought 
that an award of security for costs was appropriate in this instance, but in the end a 
majority of the tribunal held that three main factors present in this case were 
responsible for the tribunal accepting the respondent’s request.210 First, the claimant 
                                                             
206 RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia , above n 198, at [26]. 
207 Ibid, at [27]. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid, at [86]. 
210 Ibid. 
42 
 
had a history of not paying costs in other ICSID proceedings that it was involved in.211 
In this regard, the respondent drew attention to the fact that since not complying with 
costs orders in previous ICSID proceedings, the claimant had still gone on to instigate 
several other arbitration and litigation actions, suggesting that the claimant is likely to 
initiate proceedings even when it knows that it may not be able to pay a costs award 
that is ordered against it.212  
Second, the claimant had itself accepted that it had scarce financial means and 
stated that it “hope[d] to be in a position to honor a possible costs award issued against 
it”.213 Third, the involvement of a third-party funder in the case of the claimant was 
relevant.214 The respondent argued that a third-party funder might be willing to fund 
the instigation of the proceedings but that there is a danger to the respondent that the 
third-party funder might commit what the respondent called an “arbitral-hit-and-run”, 
where the third-party funder would not agree to adhere to the claimant’s 
responsibilities under any eventual costs order.215 
The claimant first argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction under Article 47 
of the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(1) to order security for 
costs.216 In the alternative, the claimant further argued that even if the tribunal does 
have jurisdiction to make an order for security for costs, exceptional circumstances 
must be present for such an order to be justified, and that these exceptional 
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circumstances were not present here.217 The claimant then proceeded to give reasons 
as to why exceptional circumstances justifying an order for security for costs were not 
present in this instance.218 Lastly, the claimant made known its belief that the 
respondent was also receiving funding for this dispute from a third-party funder, thus 
the respondent would not actually experience an instant detriment if the claimant did 
not pay costs.219 Instead, the claimant argued that an order for security for costs would 
simply act to advantage the third-party funder that was funding the respondent; the 
respondent is not susceptible to a greater risk because of its agreement with a third-
party funder.220 
In considering these arguments, the tribunal accepted that neither Article 47 of 
the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rule 39 specifically dealt with the 
tribunal’s ability to order security for costs, but noted that most ICSID tribunals have 
concluded that the tribunal possesses the ability to make such an order in exceptional 
circumstances.221 The majority justifies these wide readings by stating that the ICSID 
Convention was drafted in 1965 when “issues such as third-party funding and thus the 
shifting of financial risk away from the claiming party were not as frequent, if at all, as 
they are today”.222 
More importantly, the tribunal considered that the fact that the claimant was 
being funded by a third-party funder reinforced the respondent’s concern that the 
claimant might not adhere to a costs award that was ordered against it; the tribunal 
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noted that it was “doubtful” whether the third-party funder would otherwise volunteer 
to take on the duty of paying such an award.223 The tribunal found that, in these 
circumstances, it would be unfair to place a risk on the respondent that the third-party 
may not accept the responsibility of honoring a potential costs award that favoured the 
respondent.224 This argument highlights an important policy point as to why security 
for costs should perhaps sometimes be awarded in international arbitration. However, 
one counter argument to the court’s reasoning here is that unfairness to the respondent 
may need to be balanced with access to justice for the claimant.225 The tribunal here 
failed to consider whether it may be more important that the claimant receives 
sufficient funding from a third-party to bring a potentially meritorious claim than 
whether the respondent receives security for costs, which may leave the tribunal’s 
reasoning to feel somewhat incomplete. 
Tribunal member Gavan Griffith agreed with the outcome that the majority of the 
tribunal came to but provided different assenting reasons for his conclusion.226 Griffith 
agreed with the majority judgment that the tribunal can make security for costs orders in 
exceptional circumstances and that the facts of the present case were exceptional, and 
therefore justified an order for security for costs.227 However, instead of giving three 
different reasons why the facts of this case were exceptional, with a focus on the 
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respondent’s “one-off” non-payment history, Griffith focused wholly on the third-party 
funding issue.228  
Griffith noted that it was becoming a common problem that third-party funders are 
funding claims, effectively as a joint venture to receive a portion of the claimant’s success, 
yet third-party funders do not have to risk more than the costs they have already incurred if 
the claimant is unsuccessful where security for costs orders are not made.229 Griffith states 
that such a business setting is “the gambler’s Nirvana: Heads I win, and Tails I do not 
lose”.230 As a matter of policy, Griffith holds that such funders should have to bear the 
same risks as the actual claimant does in supporting a claimant to take a claim.231 Griffith 
states that his “determinative proposition is that once it appears that there is third-party 
funding of an investor’s claims, the onus is cast on the claimant to disclose all relevant 
factors and to make a case why security for costs orders should not be made”.232 Like the 
majority, Griffith does not address the issue of a claimant’s increased access to justice 
where third-party funding is available, and what effect ordering security for costs may have 
on this access. 
The dissenting judge, Edward Nottingham, argued mostly that the language of 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39(1) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules do not 
support the conclusion that security for costs can be ordered in this instance.233 However, 
of interest to this paper is his articulation of some of the issues that he believes that third-
party funding of ICSID arbitrations may raise: 
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“Should third-party funding ever be permitted? If so, under what conditions? Is such funding 
a legitimate tool allowing the pursuit of meritorious claims which otherwise could not be 
brought? Or is it a form of reprehensible barrarty? What information about the nature of the 
funding or the identity of the funder should be relevant? What are the terms of the funding 
contract? Indeed, how is third-party funding defined? Would an insurance contract under 
which a State financed the defense of a case fit the definition?” 
The attitudes shown towards third-party funding in the majority and assenting 
opinions, and criticisms of these opinions, may assist in trying to determine what the 
attitude towards third-party funding will be in an instance of investor-state arbitration that 
New Zealand might have to partake in. A court or tribunal that treads carefully in regard to 
the issue of third-party funding is likely to be more open to imposing restrictions on aspects 
of third-party funding or to taking measures to protect a party from the other party’s use of 
third party funding. Thus the more skeptical that previous ICSID judgments and any 
accompanying commentary are about third-party funding, the more likely it is that a 
generous approach will be taken to awarding security for costs against a party funded by a 
third-party funder. In turn, such a generous approach will make it easier for states to find 
themselves up against a third-party funder in international arbitration as states are less 
likely to be unable to retrieve costs at the end of an arbitration proceeding.  
However, it is unclear that states up against an investor will be awarded security for 
costs on a regular basis. First, as emphasized in the St Lucia decision, exceptional 
circumstances will probably have to be present before a court or tribunal will award 
security for costs.234 Second, the St Lucia decision was the first decision to award security 
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for costs in an investor-state dispute, which suggests it will be a rare occurence.235 Third, 
the St Lucia decision has been criticized, which may have an influence on the approach that 
later courts and tribunals will have in regard to awarding security for costs in investor-state 
disputes.  
Some of the main criticisms of the St Lucia decision are aimed at the beliefs that the 
majority and the assenting judgment appear to take for granted.236 One commentator listed 
four beliefs that the decision was probably based on and proceeded to argue that these 
beliefs were unfounded.237 The four beliefs are as follows: 
1) Funders do not carefully assess, review and consider the claims they fund; they gamble.  
2) Come what may, funders do not lose. They are always winners.  
3) Had the founders of the Convention foreseen the emergence of third party funding, they 
would have required automatic orders for security for costs in funded cases.  
4) Because of the nature of their business, funders should take a larger risk than that of the 
possibility of losing the entire investment in arbitral proceedings when the average total costs 
are of USD8 million.238 
 
The commentator that identified these four beliefs argues that both the majority and 
the assent overlooked the following key facts that undermine these beliefs to some 
extent.239 First, professional funders only fund claims after careful investigation into the 
claim and with the assistance of highly proficient practitioners; professional funders are not 
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gamblers.240 Second, as many as half of the claimants that seek third-party funding for their 
claims do actually have the financial resources to fund their own claim, but they simply 
make a financial choice to avoid having their liquid capital be caught up in financing a 
dispute and instead to prefer to invest that capital in other investments.241  
Third, if a third-party funder has to provide security for costs, this significantly 
increases the cost of the investment for a third-party funder; freezing an immense amount 
of money for the duration of the entire proceeding is expensive.242 Moreover, an 
application for security for costs is likely to lengthen the proceedings as well as make the 
proceedings more expensive.243 Fourthly, many established funders include After the Event 
Insurance (ATE insurance), which the claimant pays a premium for and which creates an 
indemnity for the other party’s costs in the instance that the claimant is unsuccessful.244 
Due to the inconvenience of having to be part of proceedings for security for costs, the 
commentator make two recommendations for the situation where either a claimant or a 
respondent seeks security for costs in a court or tribunal proceeding: that in the case of an 
abusive claim a claimant or respondent should have to remunerate the funds that have been 
immobilized at a sufficient rate; and, that the party claiming security for costs should 
immediately repay the party who had to defend the application in the instance where 
security for costs is not granted.245 
In light of these facts, the commentator makes a good point that routinely awarding 
unremunerated security for costs when half of potential claimants need a third-party funder, 
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loan from the bank or a mortgage in order to fund a claim, is likely to obstruct access to 
justice for some of these claimants.246 The issue of access to justice was largely ignored in 
the St Lucia decision. Commentators also note that investment treaty dispute mechanisms 
were created to guard those parties that needed guarding, namely, the investors.247 If 
investors constantly have to pay security for costs in the event that they are funded by a 
third-party funder, it will greatly increase the costs of pursuing a claim after obtaining 
third-party funding, which may defeat the purpose of allowing third-party funding in 
international arbitration: to  increase the likelihood that meritorious claims are brought to a 
court or tribunal.248 From this commentator’s arguments, the conclusion can be drawn that 
the main drawbacks of a decision like St Lucia are that it makes it more difficult for 
investors to use third-party funding, which may create access to justice issues. 
Many have called for regulation in this area of security for costs.249 The call for 
regulation is mainly due to the potential of the St Lucia decision to create uncertainty for 
the funding market.250 As St Lucia was the first ruling to award security for costs against a 
claimant with a third-party funder in investor-state arbitration, not all third-party funders 
may have previously considered such an award to be a possibility.251 The dissenting 
tribunal member in St Lucia stated that “the general concerns about third-party funding and 
security for costs can and should be addressed by the Administrative Council in its rule-
making capacity, if there is a problem that needs to be dealt with”.252 One way to mitigate 
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this risk without regulation that may be adopted by funders is an increase in care in the 
selection of arbitrators.253 Third-party funders will probably urge claimants to select 
arbitrators that are less disposed to award security for costs against claimants funded by a 
third-party funder.254 Whether or not the Administrative Council will change the rules to 
clarify the position as to security for costs remains uncertain, but in the meantime it is 
likely that third-party funders will simply try to choose arbitrators that are unlikely to 
award security for costs. 
Whether or not security for costs can be awarded against a claimant with a third-party 
funder will affect the state of New Zealand in international arbitration. If New Zealand 
finds itself up against an investor in an investor-state arbitration where New Zealand cannot 
obtain security for costs against an investor who is being funded by a third-party, it 
increases the chances of New Zealand being left ‘high and dry’ and unable to retrieve costs 
in the instance that a third-party funder refuses to pay. The likelihood of security for costs 
being awarded against a third-party funder is low: St Lucia is the only tribunal that has ever 
awarded security for costs and it only did so due to “exceptional circumstances” that the 
tribunal thought were present in the case. This means that New Zealand could very well 
end up being left to pay its own costs in the event that a third-party funder refuses to adhere 
to a costs order, in the absence of a security for costs award. The possibility of this 
occurring is likely to encourage New Zealand to settle when it comes across an investor 
being funded by a third-party to remove this risk. 
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7 Issue 4: Costs Awards Against Third-Party Funders 
Since 1986, the United Kingdom courts have accepted that costs awards can be made 
against third-party funders.255 However, such awards have generally been reserved for 
exceptional circumstances.256 These awards are also more likely to be made against 
professional, or for-profit, funders, rather than against “pure”, or non-profit, funders.257  
The court in Abraham v Thompson outlined the competing policy factors as to whether a 
costs award should be made against a third-party funder: 
“It may be unjust to a successful defendant to be left with unrecovered costs, but the plaintiff’s 
freedom of access to the courts has priority… It is preferable that a successful defendant should 
suffer the injustice of irrecoverable costs than that a plaintiff with a genuine claim should be 
prevented from pursuing it.” 258 
However, a recent High Court decision in the United Kingdom has suggested that, 
if a claim is not successful, a third-party funder will generally be equally accountable to 
pay the defendant’s costs as the funded party.259 The Court noted two points to mitigate the 
harshness of this rule on funders.260 First, the ‘Arkin cap’ will be applied.261 This cap limits 
the funder’s liability to the level of funding given.262 Second, a funder will only be 
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accountable for the defendant’s costs that were sustained from the time of the funder’s 
involvement.263 
Though the United Kingdom’s domestic law is extremely developed in this area, it 
may not be useful to the international arbitration community. The power of the United 
Kingdom courts to make a costs order is found in the Supreme Court Act 1981.264 
However, in international arbitration, an arbitrator has no personal jurisdiction over the 
funder.265 Therefore, an international arbitrator lacks the authority to make a costs order 
against a third-party funder.266 Some have brainstormed ways to get around this problem:267 
i) providing a clause in the arbitration agreement that a party must disclose that it is using a 
funder; 
ii) requiring the funded party to secure some sort of security to cover the costs should it lose 
the case; or 
iii) allowing the parties to agree in advance to the arbitrator having the authority to issue a costs 
order against a third-party funder. 
However, as none of these suggestions have yet been put into practice, it is not clear 
whether the international arbitration community will accept any of these suggestions or 
even whether they will work. However, as the United Kingdom has a clear domestic 
framework for this issue it is possible that if the third suggestion is used, the international 
arbitration community may be able to draw on United Kingdom law in deciding whether to 
issue a costs order against a third-party funder. 
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Whether or not a costs order can be made against a third-party funder, and in what 
circumstances, could have a huge effect on how the state of New Zealand will fare in 
international arbitration. If New Zealand is up against another party who is being funded by 
a third party funder and loses, New Zealand will be faced with the prospect of having to 
pay their own costs. Due to the size of the country and it’s potentially smaller financial 
budget for arbitration in relation to some other states and even large third-party funders, the 
state may have to strain its budget to pay its own costs if this happens for several 
arbitrations. This could in turn undermine New Zealand’s bargaining power as it may 
encourage New Zealand to settle with parties who are funded by a third-party funder.  
Some of the above listed ways to get around the problem may be easier for New 
Zealand to implement considering some of the law’s attitudes to third-party funding in New 
Zealand. As the torts of maintenance and champerty are still technically parts of New 
Zealand law, some of the suspicious attitudes to third-party funding that these torts brought 
with them are likely to remain in New Zealand.268 With this mindset, it is more likely that 
the state of New Zealand will be willing to make efforts to put in place various precautions 
as to the payment of costs in the event of arbitration. 
8 Issue 5: Recovery of Costs by Third-Party Funders 
Another large question mark that has come with the rise of third-party funding in 
international arbitration is whether third-party funders can recover their costs as part of a 
costs award.269 In countries like Finland, Nigeria, Sweden and Brazil third-party costs are 
generally not recoverable because these costs are not costs that the claimant has incurred 
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from the proceedings, and the third-party funder itself has no right to recover its own 
costs.270 However, it is possible that the position at international law may differ.  
The International Bar Association’s 2014 Guidelines suggest that a third-party providing 
funding in arbitration “may be considered to bear the identity of [a] party” for the purposes 
of conflicts of interest in relationships.271 These Guidelines may suggest that for some 
purposes, the claimant and the third-party funder may be viewed as having the same 
identity. As the reason that third-party funders cannot claim costs in the domestic countries 
listed above is because the claimant is considered to have a separate identity from the third-
party funder, the Guidelines may take a different approach to costs.  
However, there may be some reasons why it is inappropriate for third party funders 
to recover costs. Because funding an arbitration is expensive, a third-party funder will 
undertake extensive due diligence of the case and its likelihood of success before agreeing 
to a fund a case.272 Due to this extensive research, it may seem appropriate for third-party 
funders to bear any loss as they are a for-profit business that are capable of calculating and 
planning for the financial risks of their business.  
If third-party funders can recover costs, third-party funders will probably be more 
likely to take on more cases as there is less for third-party funders to lose financially. This 
may lead to an increasing number of claims, which may cause New Zealand to find itself 
party to an increasing number of investor-state arbitrations. Moreover, there will be more 
situations in which the state of New Zealand will have to pay costs.  
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V Effect of Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration 
on New Zealand 
A Overview 
As already discussed in this paper, to date third-party funding has only affected 
New Zealand in the context of domestic litigation. Further, third-party funding in domestic 
litigation has only occurred on a small scale. To date, there has not yet been much 
regulation around third-party funding in litigation or in any other context by the courts or 
by Parliament. Nevertheless, regardless of any future regulation of third-party funding at a 
domestic level, third-party funding is almost sure to affect New Zealand at an international 
level due to the prevalence of third-party funding in international arbitration. The growing 
prevalence of third-party funding in international commercial arbitration will affect all 
actors in this sphere of dispute resolution.273  
The area in which the existence of third-party funding in international commercial 
arbitration may especially affect New Zealand is in the setting of investor-state 
arbitration.274 In New Zealand, investor-state arbitration has become a contentious matter in 
light of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). The TPPA is a regional free-
trade agreement that has not yet been established.275 However, if the TPPA is established 
and it covers investor-state arbitration, it is possible that New Zealand may find itself in 
arbitration proceedings against an investor that is being funded by a third-party funder.276  
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Even if a particular state or investor does not enlist the services of a third-party 
funder in arbitration proceedings, that state or investor may encounter a party in arbitral 
proceedings who has enlisted the services of a third-party funder.277 Arbitrators will also be 
required to rule on issues that may be affected by the existence of a third-party funder 
being involved, or a particular arbitrator may even be selected by a third-party funder.278 
This is likely to be the case regardless of whether third-party funding continues to remain 
legal in a domestic context: the surge in popularity of third-party funding in international 
arbitration may influence states to permit third-party funding in international arbitration 
even if third-party funding is not permitted at a domestic level.279 For example, Professor 
Rogers had noted that even though Singapore has strongly prohibited third-party funding in 
a domestic context, it has made an exception for international arbitration.280  
B  The TPPA and Investor Rights 
As above, the issues currently present in the context of third-party funding in 
international arbitration and how they are decided will have various effects on how the 
state of New Zealand is likely to fare in international arbitration. Another factor to consider 
in discussing how third-party funding in international arbitration affects New Zealand is the 
TPPA. The TPPA is a regional free trade agreement between New Zealand, the United 
States, and ten other North American, South American and Asia-Pacific states that is still in 
progress.281 The TPPA would most likely grant investors substantive rights in the context 
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of investor-state arbitration.282 The effect of investors being granted broad rights under the 
TPPA may be to increase the leverage of investors against states like New Zealand. If the 
TPPA does incorporate investor-state arbitration, New Zealand may be up against an 
investor that has not only received third-party funding in arbitration proceedings but is also 
protected by expansive rights.283 Thus the combination of the increase in third-party 
funding in international arbitration and the increased protection for investor rights may 
make investor-state arbitration a lot harder for New Zealand in the future.  
However, the TPPA is still a work in progress and it is not certain that investor 
protections will be included. Whether investors should be granted substantive rights in the 
TPPA is a contentious issue for several reasons, not least because it may provide investors 
with increased leverage against states. The contentiousness of this issue was highlighted 
when in 2012 over a hundred jurists wrote a letter entitled “An open letter from lawyers to 
the negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership urging the rejection of investor-state 
dispute settlement”.284 These jurists were all from countries that had already agreed or were 
considering agreeing to be part of the TPPA.285 
In this letter, these lawyers explain why they believe that foreign investor 
protections and their capability to be enforced through investor-state arbitration should not 
be included in the TPPA.286 Some of the problems that these lawyers identity relate to 
investor rights and some relate to the current system of investor-state arbitration itself. 
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They base their views on the notion of the rule of law.287 They note that Australia has 
stated that it will not succumb to the Investor-State system under a TPPA and other future 
trade agreements and argue that other countries should follow suit.288 However, New 
Zealand will almost definitely be party to the TPPA if it is concluded, and will therefore be 
vulnerable to whatever problems may be associated with the TPPA.  
Many of the problems that these lawyers identify with foreign investor protections 
would exacerbate the issues that might arise in investor-state arbitration where a third-party 
funder is involved. This is because, as above, third-party funding is likely to cause both an 
increase in the number of arbitration cases taken against states by investors and states are 
unlikely to be able to take advantage of third-party funding in the same way that investors 
can.289 Therefore the increasing popularity of third-party funding may put investors in a 
stronger position in terms of international arbitration, whereas third-party funding is 
unlikely to do the same for states. The combination of the benefits that third-party funding 
will provide investors and the proposed investor protections in the TPPA may largely 
disadvantage states in some international arbitration cases. The rule of law issues that the 
open letter outlines show how the proposed investor protections under the TPPA may 
further disadvantage states.  
The first rule of law problem that these lawyers see with the proposed rights for 
investors under the TPPA is that these rights may be so expansive that they compromise the 
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sovereign rights of states.290 The TPPA’s apparent purpose is to make sure that foreign 
investors can get compensation if a government takes their real property and the domestic 
court systems in that country are inadequate to provide an effective remedy.291 These 
lawyers believe that the TPPA goes further than it needs to go in order to protect investors: 
the TPPA definition of “covered investments” includes not only real property but also other 
investments such as intangible contract rights.292 As well as the rights themselves being 
expansive, these lawyers are also concerned that these rights will be interpreted 
generously.293  
The potential for the rights of foreign investors in the TPPA to be read too widely 
needs to be put in the context of other investment treaties which also grant substantive 
rights to investors.294 Several recent Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) have also been extended to cover more than real property and 
have been interpreted generously, with the result that some of these interpretations have 
protected international corporations’ property and economic interests over the right of 
states to sovereignty.295 The fear is that the wide interpretation of these other instruments is 
indicative of how investor rights in the TPPA will be interpreted, so that the TPPA would 
result in more importance being placed on the preservation of the financial interests of 
transnational corporations over states’ sovereign rights to make laws in the public 
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interest.296 The lawyers claim that, in compromising the sovereign rights of states, granting 
investors these rights may compromise the ideal of the rule of law.297  
The second rule of law problem that these lawyers envisage is that granting 
investors these rights will increase the instances in which foreign investors can take 
advantage of more rights than domestic firms and investors can under their national law, to 
the extent that investor rights may interfere with government actions.298 Again, this 
problem is likely to be exacerbated by the increasing use of third-party funding as investors 
will probably be more likely to assert these rights if they have more financial backing. 
There have already been instances in which investor’s rights have interfered with 
government actions. For example, under some FTAs and BITs, arbitral tribunals have 
issued injunctions against government actions.299 In one case, an arbitral tribunal ruled that 
the North American Free Trade Agreement allowed the tribunal to review government 
measures, like the function of a domestic court and the standing rules of civil procedure, for 
potential breaches of investor rights.300 The interference of expansive investor rights with 
government and judicial functions is problematic from a rule of law perspective. In New 
Zealand, if the TPPA is concluded with broad investor rights, it could arguably allow an 
arbitral tribunal to issue an injunction against government actions. An increase in third-
party funding is likely to make this occurrence even more probable as third-party funding 
will give investors increased opportunities to argue their rights.  
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The lawyers argue that the third rule of law issue is the structure of the Investor-
State system tribunals, which the TPPA will probably make it easier for investors to get to 
if wide rights for investors are included.301 Their concern is that investment arbitration is 
currently “not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the resolution of disputes 
between sovereign nations and private investors”.302 First, these tribunals permit lawyers to 
act in a way that would not be ethical for a judge: lawyers can swap between their roles as 
arbitrators and advocates for investors.303 Second, the Investor-State tribunals do not allow 
non-investor litigants and other affected parties to participate in the system.304 Third, there 
is a perceived issue that these Investor-State tribunals are being used more and more often, 
not merely as a last resort.305 The availability of third-party funding to investors is already 
likely to increase the number of cases that are taken to international arbitration. Therefore 
the combination of third-party funding and the wide investor rights in the TPPA means that 
the problematic structure of the Investor-State system tribunals could be an increasing 
concern.  
In sum, the authors of this open letter believe that there are several rule of law 
issues currently present in international investment arbitration, including the current 
structure of the Investor-State tribunals and the wide rights already given to investors.306 
These lawyers are concerned that including wide investor rights in the TPPA may cause 
further infringements to the notion of the rule of law.307 Further, the rule of law problems 
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that this open letter points out will probably be aggravated by the increasing popularity of 
third-party funding for two main reasons.308  
First, third-party funding may increase the amount of claims that investors will 
bring against states as an investors’ lack of funds is much less likely to be an issue when 
they are considering whether or not to take legal action against a state.309 Second, an 
investor that is being backed by a third-party funder may be able to engage in a longer 
investor-state arbitration than an investor without this backing as third-party funders are 
likely to have “deep pockets”.310 Thus the rise of third-party funding will probably mean 
that there are more claims with a longer duration, making it even more important that the 
TPPA strikes the correct balance between investor rights and the rights of states. However, 
the current proposals for comprehensive investor rights to be included in the TPPA are 
likely to tip the balance in favour of investors in investor-state arbitration. This issue, 
combined with the fact that the increasing popularity of third-party funding is likely to also 
advantage investors, may leave states in a difficult position both financially and legally 
when they are up against an investor in international arbitration. 
As New Zealand is likely to be a part of the TPPA, wide investor rights in the 
TPPA may make investor-state arbitration more difficult for New Zealand for the above 
reasons. The fact that third-party funders are more reluctant to back states may mean that 
New Zealand could find itself up against an investor in an arbitration proceeding where the 
investor is not only backed by a third party but also has wide-ranging rights. In this 
instance, the rights that the proposed TPPA will confer on investors may mean that states 
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are at a disadvantage in international arbitration proceedings as the investor that they are up 
against may not only have a large amount of funds due to third-party funding but may also 
have a large amount of legal leverage.  
VI Conclusion 
In sum, the increasing popularity of third-party funding in international arbitration 
has brought with it a whole range of issues for the international arbitration community to 
deal with. The first main question is whether regulation is needed in the third-party funding 
industry, and whether domestic law can be of any use to formulating such regulations. 
Regulation would be useful for increasing certainty. The “true claimant” model that some 
domestic countries use is likely to be the best base on which to build regulations in 
international law. Currently, the issues around disclosure of the presence of a third-party 
funder and the terms of the agreement, security for costs, costs awards and recovery for 
costs are all controversial and are likely to spark much more debate in the near future.  
Whether third-party funding in international arbitration becomes regulated or not, 
and if so the approach that the international arbitration community takes to these issues, 
will affect the position that New Zealand is in when it faces investor-state arbitration. As 
third-party funders are much more likely to back investors than they are states, New 
Zealand will probably benefit from a stricter approach to third-party funding.311  
The requirement at international law for third-party funding to be disclosed lends 
toward a stricter approach and will probably benefit New Zealand by informing the state of 
what it will be up against in any given arbitration.  However, it is not yet clear what 
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approach the international community will take to ordering any terms of a funding 
agreement to be disclosed. The more terms that are required to be disclosed, the better 
position New Zealand will be in to know what to expect from the arbitration.  
Security for costs is a more volatile area. Though it seems that security for costs in a 
dispute where a third-party funder is involved will generally not be ordered based on 
previous ICSID decisions, the St Lucia decision suggests that a tribunal might award 
security for costs in “exceptional circumstances”. New Zealand can probably expect to 
generally not be awarded security for costs when entering an international arbitration with 
an investor being funded by a third-party, meaning that there will probably often be a risk 
that the third-party funder will pay their client’s adverse costs award.  
Equally volatile is the debate over whether a costs award can be made directly 
against a third-party funder. Though domestic jurisdictions like the United Kingdom have 
very clearly answered yes to this question, there are different factors at play concerning the 
jurisdiction of an international arbitrator that may make domestic law an unreliable 
indicator of how the international arbitration community will treat this problem. If costs 
awards can be made directly against third-party funders, that will decrease the risk of New 
Zealand having to pay its own costs.  
There is also still a large question mark in international arbitration as to whether 
third-party funders can recover their costs as part of a costs award. There is little 
jurisprudence on this issue, although there are policy reasons why third-party funders 
should not be able to do so. If third-party funders can do so, New Zealand might find itself 
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paying costs more often and being party to an increasing number of international 
arbitrations as third-party funders will probably have more incentive to back claimants. 
New Zealand may be particularly affected if the international arbitration community 
takes a lenient approach to third-party funding as New Zealand is also likely to be affected 
by the potentially wide investor rights in the proposed TPPA. As third-party funders are 
more likely to support investors than states, New Zealand could face not only the obstacle 
of entering into arbitration with an investor that is being funded by a third-party funder, but 
also the obstacle of such investors having extensive rights.312 
It can be seen that third-party funding in international arbitration is currently in a 
huge state of flux. The international arbitration community has a large amount of issues to 
work through and a wide range of directions available to it in which to go. New Zealand 
will have to wait and see whether the chosen direction is one that benefits it or not. 
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